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RIGHTS OF PARTIES AND DUTIES OF CARRIERS
UNDER ORDER NOTIFY BILLS OF LADING
By MAC ASBILL*
N an order-notify shipment the shipper bills the goods to his
own order or to the order of another person and adds a direc-
tion that the carrier notify a third party of the goods' arrival.
This third party is the order-notify consignee. At the present
time the volume of shipments moving under such bills is exceed-
ingly large considering that this method of shipment is of coin-
paratively recent origin. Such a bill of lading operates as a pro-
tection to shippers, many of whom do not know the financial con-
dition of their customers and consequently, for this or other
reasons, wish to do business on a cash basis and retain control
over the shipment until the invoice is actually paid. It is now
quite customary to consign goods to shipper's order, order notify
the buyer, and to send the bill of lading with draft attached to a
local bank with instructions to deliver the bill of lading on pay-
ment of draft. Having possession of the bill of lading the pur-
chaser, order-notify consignee, can by its surrender then secure
the goods from the carrier. But until the draft is paid, or pay-
ment waived, and the bill of lading indorsed and delivered to the
consignee, the ownership in and title to the goods remain in the
shipper and he alone can give orders with respect to the goods.
The rights of the consignor and consignee in an order-notify
shipment differ widely from those of the consignor and consignee
in an ordinary shipment, and the same principles of law which
govern the latter relationship are not applicable to the former.
Likewise the duties of the carrier to the consignor and consignee
in an order-notify shipment differ from those owed the ordinary
consignor and consignee. Because of the actual difference in fact
between the two types of shipment, a new branch of the law has
been developed to apply to order-notify shipments. This law is
briefly discussed herein and the, differences in the rights, duties
and liabilities of the parties consignor, consignee and carrier, under
it reviewed and compared with the rights, duties and liabilities of
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like parties in an ordinary shipment under a straight or order bill
of lading.
In an ordinary shipment made by the seller to fill an order
when the buyer is the consignee, title to the goods usually passes
to him on delivery to the carrier of goods of the quality and
character ordered. Title having passed and the consignee being
the real owner of the goods, any damage to them in transit must
be borne by the owner unless the contract between the parties pro-
vides that the risks of transportation are to be borne by the con-
signor. In such shipments the consignor has no ownership in and
little control of the goods after their delivery to the carrier, but
possesses merely a personal right against the consignee for the
price of the merchandise. Ownership being in the consignee, the
carrier may lawfully surrender possession of the goods to him
upon their arrival at destination.
On the other hand, an order-notify shipment is held to be
notice to the carrier and to all outsiders that the shipper reserves
title to the goods,' and that he is the only person who may legally
exercise the rights of ownership over the shipment, such as, for
instance, to order diversion, etc., until the bill of lading is indorsed
and delivered to the order-notify consignee, which is usually done
after payment of draft for the purchase price and a compliance
with all conditions.' When ownership of the goods is in the
shipper, or consignor, as in an order-notify shipment, all risks of
transportation must be borne by the owner unless he has con-
tracted with the buyer for the latter to assume such risk.' There-
fore the consignor is the party who should properly file a claim
for loss or damage to the shipment, although under the decisions of
the courts the consignee may file a claim. Some courts hold that
an order-notify consignee has no such interest as will allow him
to maintain an action for loss or damage to the goods' although
other courts hold to the contrary.' In jurisdictions where an order-
notify consignee cannot sue for the loss or injury to the goods,
'Liberty National Bank v. Hines, (i92o) ii5 S. C., 82, 1o4 S. E. 313.
'Lust, Loss & Damage Claims, p. 98, note 55.
'Lust, Loss & Damage Claims, p. 99, note 56.
'Dalbey v. Mexican Cent. R. Co., (Tex. 1907) 105 S. W. 1154; Bennett
v. Railway, (1920) 107 Kans. 17, 19o Pac. 757.
'Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Abrahamson Boone Produce Co., (1917) 199
Ala. 271, 74 So. 350; Askew & Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., (907) 1 Ga. App.
79, 58 S. E. 242; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Luke, (0917) ig Ga. App.
IOO, 9o S. E. 1o4I.
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he may obtain an assignment of the consignor's claim and bring
the action in his own name.
Interstate shipments are governed by federal statutes. Under
the Pomerene Bill of Lading Act the consignor may indorse the
bill of lading to the order-notify consignee and invest him with
the title and right to possession of the goods. Section 20, par. 11
of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that an interstate car-
rier, after issuing a through bill of lading, "shall be liable to the
lawful holder of such receipt or bill of lading or to any party en-
titled to recover thereon . . . for the full actual loss, damage or
injury to such property . . ." The meaning of the words "law-
ful holder" is fully explained in various court decisions and in
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, it was said:
"What is the liability imposed upon the carrier? It is the
liability to any holder of the bill of lading which the primary
carrier is required to issue, 'for any loss, damage, or injury to
such property caused by it' or by any connecting carrier to whom
the goods are delivered."
Since the order-notify consignee may become the lawful holder
of the bill of lading, it is believed that after such acquisition he is
the proper party to sue for loss or damage to an interstate ship-
ment, it being immaterial at what time the damage occurred.'
This view is in keeping with the decision of various courts
holding that such a consignee who has paid the draft attached to
the bill of lading owns the goods and can not, by refusing to ac-
cept them, avoid the payment of freight and demurrage charges
due the carrier,' or that having surrendered the bill of lading and
received the goods he is liable for the freight charges in all re-
spects as an ordinary consignee would be.'
An order-notify bill of lading ordinarily provides that the car-
rier shall not deliver the goods without a surrender of the bill of
lading properly indorsed. In one case the shipper made an order-
notify shipment from New York to Denver, Colorado. The de-
livering carrier received no notice that this was an order-notify
'Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Olivit Bros., (917) 243 U. S. 574, 61 L. Ed.
9o8, 37 S. C. R. 468; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, (1913) 226 U. S.
491, 57 L. Ed. 314, 33 S. C. R. i48; Carr v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (I916)
88 N. J. Law 235, 96 Atl. 588.
!Askew & Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., (1907) I Ga. App. 79, 58 S. E.
242.
'Southern Flour & Grain Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., (1918) 22
Ga. App. 403, 95 S. E. IooI.
'Wabash R. v. Bloomgarden, (1920) 212 Mich. 410, ioS N. W. 443.
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shipment but delivered the same to the consignee without a sur-
render of the bill of lading. A draft was drawn upon the con-
signee with bill of lading attached, which was not paid, and there-
upon suit was brought against the delivering carrier for a con-
version. The plaintiff recovered and the court held that it was the
duty of the delivering carrier to ascertain the terms of the bill of
lading and if it had done so it would have found that this was
an order-notify shipment and that delivery was improper without
a surrender of the bill of lading."
In another case the consignor, by mistake, sent the original bill
of lading direct to the order-notify consignee unindorsed, and the
carrier delivered the goods without requiring any indorsement to
a consignee who became insolvent before paying the purchase
price. When suit was brought against the carrier for an improper
delivery, the court held that the loss was the result of the carrier's
negligence in failing to require a proper indorsement of the bill
of lading."
That delivery without a proper indorsement of the bill of lad-
ing amounts to a conversion and renders the carrier liable for the
full value of the goods has been held in other cases.'
Hence, the carrier's duty under an order-notify shipment is not
complete when the goods reach destination. To carry out its con-
tract with the shipper the carrier must then notify the order-notify
consignee of the goods' arrival and keep possesssion of them until
such consignee has secured possession of the bill of lading prop-
erly indorsed, and offered to surrender it to the carrier in return
for the goods. Should the carrier either erroneously or intention-
ally deliver the goods to the order-notify consignee without re-
quiring the latter to surrender the bill of lading, the carrier would
be liable for a wrongful conversion of the property if such con-
signee did not hold the bill of lading," and such misdelivery was
the cause of the shipper losing the goods. The liability of the
carrier in this respect is strictly enforced, but where delivery is
made to a person who has the bill or who has authority from the
holder of the bill and the cause of the shipper's loss is not the
"Furman v. Union Pacific R. Co., (1887) lo6 N. Y. 579, 13 N. E. 587.
'Southern Ry. Co. v. Massee & Felton Lumber Co., (igi) 23 Ga.
App. 3og, 98 S. E. io6.
'Keystone Grape Co. v. Hustis, (igig) 232 Mass. 162, 122 N. E. 269,
"Lust, Loss & Damage Claims, p. io5, note 57; King v. Barbarin,
(1917) 249 Fed. 3o3; Southern R. Co. v. Hodgson Bros. Co., (i9g) 148
Ga. 851, 98 S. E. 541.
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failure to require surrender of the bill but the improper acquisi-
tion of it by the deliveree, or his improper subsequent conduct, the
mere failure to require presentation and surrender of the bill will
not make the delivery a conversion. '
At the request of the consignor, the carrier may, of course,
deliver to the order-notify consignee without a surrender of the
bill of lading, since this would be a new agreement altering the
provision of the first one. Where a terminal carrier refused to
deliver a car of potatoes until the order-notify bill of lading was
produced, although the initial carrier directed it to deliver with-
out a surrender of the bill of lading, and because of such delay in
delivery the shipment froze, the initial carrier was held liable.'
After an unauthorized delivery by the carrier, the failure of
the shipper to even attempt to recovor possession would not relieve
the carrier of its liability for a conversion, nor would the carrier
be relieved of liability if, by its own efforts, it recovered the goods
and tendered them to the shipper, though the latter act might
mitigate the damages.
The matter of delivery by the carrier in order-notify ship-
ments being so important to it and the shipper, it is necessary to
see what acts of the carrier amount to a delivery. The weight
of authority holds that where the consignee receives carload
freight on its private side track, delivery is complete when the
car is set for unloading at the usual and customary place for doing
this on such side track." In an order-notify shipment the carrier
is, therefore, not under a duty to place the car on such a delivery
track until the consignee is prepared, by the presentation of the
bill of lading, to receive the contents of the car; T and should such
a delivery, as above described, be made without requiring a sur-
render of the bill of lading, the carrier would be liabIe for a con-
version, that is, for the full price of the goods. The mere fact that
the carrier was instructed to notify a party of the arrival of the
goods would not give such a party the right to require their de-
livery without the production and surrender of the bill of lading
properly indorsed:'
"Pere Marquette R. Co. v. J. F. French & Co., (1921) 41 S. C. R. 195.
'McCotter v. Norfolk & Southern R. Co., (i919) 178 N. C. i59, 1oo
S. E. 326.
"Lust, Loss & Damage Claims, p. 1O3, note, bottom first column.
'Lyons v. New York Central, etc., Ry. Co., (19o9) i19 N. Y. S. 703.
"Killingsworth v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., (i916) 171 N. C. 47, 87
S. E. 947.
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A delivery to a private side track for the sole purpose of in-
spection, even though such an inspection is unauthorized, is not
such a delivery to the consignee as would render the carrier liable
for a conversion of the goods. For such liability there must be
an absolute and unqualified delivery to the consignee."
Inasmuch as the carrier, by delivering a shipment at a prepay
station on an order-notify bill of lading, would lose possession of
the shipment, or at any rate possession of the shipment could be
taken at that point, without a surrender of the bill of lading, the
carrier is justified in refusing to issue such bill of lading covering
a shipment consigned to a prepay or non-agency station.
Bearing in mind the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the Mark Owen Co. case"' in considering the liability of
the carrier in an order-notify shipment, it seems clear that it is
important to ascertain the nature of the track upon which delivery
is alleged to have been made. Much depends upon whether the
track was a private or a public one. In the Owen Case, above, a
car filled with grapes arrived in Chicago and was placed on a
public side track. Notice of its arrival was given and Owen
broke the seals on the car and removed a part of its contents. The
loss occurred after unloading had commenced and while the car
remained on the public track. The court held that there had been
no delivery and that access was given to the car merely in order
that the goods might be removed, and that the forty-eight hour
period of free time mentioned in section 5 of the bill of lading was
given for the purpose of allowing removal. In line with this de-
cision it is thought that the carrier can not be held liable for a con-
version for delivering an order-notify car to a public track until
after the free time has expired, provided, of course, the consignee
has not sooner removed the goods. In other words, goods on a
public track are during the continuance of the free time period
considered in the possession and under the dominion of the carrier.
In an ordinary shipment where title passes to the consignee on
shipment, he has the right to inspect the goods on their arrival;
but in an order-notify bill of lading a provision usually exists ex-
cluding the right to inspect unless provided by law or unless per-
mission is indorsed on the bill of lading or given in writing by the
shipper. This provision -being a term of the contract between the
1
'Schopp Fruit Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., (19o5) 115 Mo. App.
352, 91 S. W. 402.
"Michigan Central Ry. v. Mark Owen & Co., (1921) 41 S. C. R. 534.
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shipper and the carrier, the order-notify consignee has not even
the right to demand inspection of the shipment from the carrier
before a surrender of the bill of lading is made unless proper per-
mission is obtained. The carrier also has no right to allow an in-
spection in such cases and violates its contract with the shipper if
an unauthorized inspection is allowed. In case of such a viola-
tion, what is the liabiity of the carrier? The law is that such an
unauthorized inspection does not render the carrier liable for a
conversion so as to make it chargeable for the entire value of the
shipment,; but the carrier is liable in such cases for the actual
damage which results from its breach of contract with the shipper
in permitting an unauthorized inspection. In most cases this
damage would be the difference between the market value of the
shipment at the time of rejection and the price at which the goods
were later sold at destination or elsewhere, including all costs at-
tached to the resale. On this point an Iowa court said :
"If, however, it placed the goods on the side track and noti-
fied the consignee that it was there simply for inspection, then if
the bill of lading did not contain a provision to allow inspection
or the carrier otherwise authorized to permit it, the inspection
would be unauthorized and the carrier liable for damages re-
sulting from the same. It would not be liable as for a conversion
but for the difference between the invoice price to the consignee
at the time and place of shipment, as defined in section 3 of the
uniform bill of lading, if made thereunder, and the market value
of the shipment at the time of rejection in the nearest available
market."
In another recent case the court said.'
"It is clear upon authority that where a carrier grants a right
of inspection in such a case (inspection not authorized in bill of
lading), his act does not amount to a conversion of the goods al-
though it may result in a rejection of the goods and subsequent
non-payment of the draft by the drawee."
In the ordinary course of business, the draft is attached to the
order-notify bill of lading and the two documents deposited with
a bantk for collection. Should the bank give credit for the amount
of the draft, less exchange, it acquires a special property in the
goods and its rights can only be divested by the acceptance and
"Dudley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1go6) 58 W. Va. 604, 52 S. E. 718,
112 A. S. R. 1027.
"Anchor Mill Co. v. Burlington, etc., Ry. Co., (1897) lO2 Ia. 262, 71
N. W. 255.
"
1Model Mill Co. v. Carolina, etc., Ry. Co., (1916) 136 Tenn. 211, 188
S. W. 936.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
payment of the draft by the consignee. In such a case the rights
of the bank would supersede an attempted attachment of the
goods, and where the credit given because of the draft had been
applied as payment on a past due obligation of the consignor, the
creditor of the consignor could not divest the bank's rights in the
goods by" attaching them."
Prior to a recent decision of the United States district court,'
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals," it was the opinion of
lawyers and business men that the Pomerene Bill of Lading Act"
made an order and order-notify bill of lading a negotiable instru-
ment. A large volume of business of the country moves under
both types of bills of lading. Business men have hitherto acted
on the assumption that the bona fide purchaser of such bills ac-
quires valid rights to the property therein described. In the case
cited, the bills of lading were of the order-notify type and plain-
tiffs were the bona fide holders thereof who had paid the full value
for all the cotton recited in the bills of lading and had received 26,-
839 pounds less cotton than was recited in the bills of lading. The
bills of lading contained printed words just above the weight of
the cotton reading "weight (subject to correction)." The court
held that the limited words in the bills of lading destroyed their
negotiability and denied plaintiffs' contention that provisions in
conflict with the statutory purposes of the Bill of Lading Act are
not valid. The effect of the decision is that many order and order-
notify bills of lading have no negotiability. The result follows
that business interests should and must exercise precaution in tak-
ing up drafts secured by such bills of lading since no one can know
definitely what the rights of the bona fide purchaser of such bills
are until the question of their negotiability is settled by the United
States Supreme Court.
As the writer is of counsel in the above case, which is now be-
fore the United States Supreme Court by way of writ of error
and application for writ of certiorari? its merits will not be dis-
cussed.
"Owensboro Banking Co. v. Buck, (i9i8) i6 Ala. App. 346, 77 Sou. 940.
"Leigh Ellis & Co. v. Davis, (192i) 274 Fed. 443, affirmed, 276 Fed.
400.
"Act of Congress of August 29, i916, 39 Stat. 538; Watkins' Shippers
& Carriers pp. 1201 to 1214.
"Writ of error filed January 12, z922; application for certiorari pre-
sented January i6, 1922. Certiorari denied January 3o, 1922.
